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Abstract 
 
Considerable effort is put into the safety 
risk assessment of any flight test 
programme - and rightly so, since failures  
to apply best practice in this area may 
cause significant expense, and in extremis 
loss of life. 
 
However, it must also be remembered that 
the flight test programme itself is an 
essential component in the development of 
the aircraft or system, and that even if 
safety is never compromised, the failure of 
a test programme to deliver the required 
results on time and budget can cause 
failure of the entire aircraft programme. 
 
This paper considers the areas in which 
planning and conduct of a flight test 
programme should be protected.  In 
particular it considers the conduct of flight 
test personnel in ways which go beyond 
only safety training, the important of 
documenting all flight test planning and 
conduct and the continuous justification of 
flight test conclusions, planning project 
manning to ensure that the loss (for 
whatever reason) of key personnel or 
equipment does not cause complete failure 
of the flight test programme, how to 
recover from significant programme 
disruptions, and most importantly whilst 
protecting or recovering the flight test 
programme – how to ensure that safety is 
not compromised in the process. 
 
 
The relationship between safety and 
programme objectives 
 
It is pertinent before commencing upon 
any flight test programme to question why 
it is to be flown.  Generally the reasons 
will fall into one or more of three 
categories, which are (a) to learn 
something new about either the aircraft or 
some aspect of science, (b) to demonstrate 
either that the aircraft itself can be operated 
safely, or if not why not, and (c) to 
determine some aspect of safe operating 
limitations.   
 
In this context, safety becomes a means to 
an end, not an end in itself.  If safety is 
compromised, then this will at the very 
least cause cost.  Damage to an aircraft or 
to equipment under test will require costly 
repairs, and in all likelihood compromise 
flight test data.  A particularly public 
accident can additionally dent the 
credibility of whatever item is under test, 
which it is likely the flight tester’s 
employer hopes to sell.  An additional risk 
of-course is that of injury which apart from 
the obvious human tragedy, is likely to 
remove key personnel from the 
programme. 
 
So, any accident, unserviceability, or 
injury is likely to cause cost and delay.  
This can dent sales, or even have such an 
impact upon the programme as to prevent 
the product ever becoming viable for the 
end user at-all.  The end result of this is 
likely to be unemployment for many 
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within an organisation, including those 
within the flight test department. 
 
The conclusion then is clear, the flight test 
programme itself must be protected, this is 
additional to, but not separate from, all 
obvious and necessary requirements to 
protect flight test safety itself. 
 
 
Continuity and programme protection 
issues at the BMAA 
 
The British Microlight Aircraft 
Association (BMAA) is responsible for the 
oversight of a fleet of approximately 3,500 
aeroplanes, predominantly in the United 
Kingdom.  This oversight includes the 
approval of new amateur built aeroplane 
types at a rate of about 2 types (plus 
numerous variants) per year, as well as 
annually the flight testing of around 60 
new amateur built aeroplanes, each of 
which must, even if apparently a “series 
aircraft”, be assumed to have some 
variation from a known good standard.  
Further flight testing may include safety 
investigations or major modifications such 
as flying control or powerplant changes.  
This is managed centrally from the 
association’s technical office in 
Deddington, Oxfordshire using a pool of 
13 variously qualified Test Pilots who all 
have other professional activities and are 
spread across the country.  Flight Test 
Engineers are not normally used in 
microlight flight testing, although senior 
airworthiness engineers may sometimes 
take this role. 
 
A typical prototype test programme (for 
example, to obtain approval data for an 
aeroplane type which is either new, or new 
to the UK) is likely to only own one 
aeroplane with limited instrumentation, 
and primarily managed by a small team at 
a location remote from the Deddington 
technical office.  Budgets are likely to be 
small, and predicated upon an early ability 
to release the aircraft onto the market.  It is 
also likely to be the case that the team 
managing the project “in the field” have no 
prior experience of such a project, and so 
need to bring in external test flying 
expertise, as well as learn about issues 
such as design control and reporting for 
which they have limited preparation or 
sympathy. 
 
A typical recent example of this was that 
of the clearance programme for the 
Savannah VG (Figure 1 below) which is a 
derivative of the better known MXP740 
Savannah (Reference [1] and Figure 2 
below).  The Savannah VG shared a 
fuselage with the earlier MXP740, but 
boasted an uprated powerplant, removal of 
leading edge slats, and fitment of leading 
edge vortex generators intended to keep 
upper surface flow attached at high angles  
of attack.  In simplistic terms, the 
aeroplane had a new wing and new engine, 
thus requiring a substantial re-assessment 
of take-off and landing performance, 
longitudinal static and dynamic stability, 
stalling and spinning characteristics, as  
well as a less substantial requirement to re-
evaluate lateral and directional stability 
and control, powerplant behaviour, and 
conduct some CG range expansion.  This 
was projected to a flight test programme of 
around 20 hours, which would be 
conducted from the company’s base at 
Sandtoft airfield, some 220 miles from 
Deddington, and 150 miles from the 
nearest test pilot’s usual base. 
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Figure 1, Savannah VG UK prototype 
 
 
Figure 2, MXP740 Savannah 
 
 
Figure 3, Savannah VG leading edge vortex generators 
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A single test pilot was allocated to the 
programme, with remote management of 
his flying of the programme being agreed 
by the Chief Test Pilot and Chief Technical 
Officer combined with local design control 
and maintenance management.  Initial 
progress was steady but erratic – the 
requirement to coincide availability of the 
test pilot, small support team, aircraft, and 
weather, usually with some notice required 
to all parties, means that microlight flight 
testing often progresses as pauses then 
leaps forward.  The programme had 
however progressed about 15 hours when 
due to a serious accident whilst flying an 
unrelated test programme, he became 
suddenly unavailable.  It was rapidly 
realised that there was no available test 
pilot current on type, putting progress of an 
important programme in significant 
jeopardy.  So, the BMAA and company 
management teams were faced with the 
problem that only having had a single pilot 
fly the aeroplane, but also with the 
realisation that any opinions about the 
aircraft had come from a single test pilot, 
who was not now readily available to 
discuss them.  Inevitably, the last part of 
the programme was also the higher risk 
part. 
 
In this case, there was approximately a 1 
month delay in the programme, before 
another test pilot became available – this 
was fortunately a pilot who had 4 years 
previously participated in clearance of the 
MXP740 variant, so was familiar but not 
current with the type.  Bringing that pilot 
into the process so late meant initially a 
substantial documentation review, since he 
had to both re-familiarise himself with 
previously tested aircraft characteristics, 
and become fully familiar with a 
substantial amount of flight testing 
progress, conduct his own review of this 
and understanding all of the conclusions  
and recommendations (some of which 
were disagreed with, also requiring 
additional senior management 
involvement).  One product of this review 
was the conclusion that the spinning 
evaluation required some re-visiting; this 
created an additional time-consuming 
difficulty, which was the need for this test 
pilot, who had not flown a spinning 
programme for several years, to obtain re-
currency training. Further complications 
were introduced by the operating company 
using this opportunity of delay to 
implement a planned design change, 
without communicating this to the BMAA.  
Overall it can be seen that the lack of a 
second test pilot in the programme caused 
both substantial delays when a key 
individual became unavailable, but 
substantial extra time and cost once a 
suitable replacement was found. 
 
 
An alternative example at BMAA shows 
how sensible programme protection can 
ensure continuity.  During the flight test 
programme of the British variant of the 
French X’Air ‘F’ (Reference [2] and 
Figure 4 below) , which was scheduled to 
be an approximately 40 hour programme 
(in practice somewhat longer, as is often 
the case) two test pilots were allocated to 
the programme, who shared the flying.  
Only one of these was current on spinning, 
and so he was scheduled to fly the spinning 
programme in the aircraft.  When it came 
to the programme however, it was found 
that his relatively large frame rendered him 
unable to fly the aircraft whilst wearing the 
personal parachute and helmet considered 
necessary.  The problem however was 
reasonably readily solved by flying the 
spinning programme with a 2 test-pilot 
crew of the second (type but not spin 
current) test pilot, and a third test pilot who 
was both spinning current and had 
maintained a watching brief on the 
programme.  Thus any time and cost 
penalties were minimal. 
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Figure 4, X'Air 'F' (also known as the X'Air Falcon) 
 
Appropriate programme protection 
 
The section above might well give the 
impression that the authors would advocate 
a strenuous programme protection plan for 
every flight test programme.  This is not 
the case; it must be considered that just as 
programme delays cost money, so to do the 
measures required to protect the 
programme.  However, the subject should 
always be considered, in two important 
contexts: 
 
(a) How important is programme 
protection? 
Before undertaking a protection plan, 
consider the alternative methods – from 
full duplication of the programme 
resources (somewhat extreme and 
expensive) to simply ensuring that all plans 
and reports are copied to a competent flight 
test professional (reasonably low cost).  
There is no absolutely correct answer to 
this problem, but it is always preferable to 
consider the issues and to deliberately 
decide upon the approach that fits a 
particular programme, rather than either 
ignore the issues (probably ensuring that 
protection is inadequate) or automatically 
applying stringent protection measures 
which may be over-complex and over-
expensive for the task. 
 
(b) Physical safety and  programme 
protection must be related. 
Throughout any consideration of 
programme protection, it must never be 
forgotten than physical safety is 
inextricably linked to programme 
protection.  If the safety case is taken to the 
extreme that all flying ceases for a period, 
whilst all involved are extremely safe, the 
programme itself comes under serious  
jeopardy.  Conversely, whilst measures 
may be taken to protect or to recover a 
programme – this should never be allowed 
to remove focus from the requirement for 
operational safety, since a subsequent 
accident whilst maintaining or restoring an 
important programme is unacceptable both 
in terms of human and financial cost, and 
in terms of the effect that this is likely to 
have upon the programme itself. 
 
An example of a successful minimally 
protected programme 
 
Approval was being sought for approval of 
the Verner 133M Engine (Reference [3], 
Figure 5)  in the United Kingdom for use 
on microlight aeroplanes.  This was not a 
major project at that time, being considered 
by the importer of the X’Air series of 
aircraft as a potential alternative to the 
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more commonly used Rotax 582 and 912 
[4] and Jabiru 2200 [5] engines.  An X’Air 
‘F’ aircraft was available as a test bed 
which could be made available, but release 
of the aircraft was not urgent, whilst failure 
of the programme carried limited 
commercial risk. 
 
 
Figure 5, Verner 133M Engine fitted to X'Air 'F' Aircraft 
 
In this case, the approach taken was 
deliberately minimalist; a single aeroplane 
and test pilot were allocated, with testing 
conducted as the pilot and aircraft were 
available.  All tests were documented 
promptly, but little else was put in place in 
terms of specific programme protection.  
Confidence in this approach was borne out 
by the results, which were a successful 
programme (in that it was conducted 
within the long time and small financial 
budgets set) and sufficient data being 
obtained to allow approval of the engine – 
despite several occasions where 
mechanical failures or unavailability of the 
test pilot needed to be accommodated. 
 
 
Consideration of programme recovery 
 
Consider the case that a programme 
protection plan is in place, and something 
goes wrong – varying from the less 
extreme case of the project test pilot being 
rendered unfit to fly by a prolonged cold, 
to the more extreme case of severe damage 
to an aircraft and an injured test crew.  
Regardless of the circumstances, the 
programme must be got back on track – to 
protect the programme, and ultimately the 
organisation.  Change in the way the 
programme is managed is inevitable – 
particularly where key personnel are 
changed, since no two flight testers will 
have an identical approach to management, 
safety assessment, or the development of 
flight test conclusions.  Whilst recovering 
the programme, this is the time when 
physical safety of aircraft, crews and other 
parties must now be considered with great 
care.  The following questions should be 
asked: 
 
- Are the replacement test 
crew current on type and 
variant? 
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- Are the replacement test 
crew current in the flight 
test techniques in use? 
- With any changes in 
personnel and approach, are 
the ongoing conclusions and 
recommendations still fully 
supportable and self 
consistent? 
- Do any changes in any 
management approach 
cause either unnecessary 
and expensive duplication 
of previous testing effort 
(some is almost certainly 
essential of-course to bring 
new crews up to speed) or, 
far more seriously, the 
inadvertent omission of 
important aspects of 
testing? 
- Is any revised physical 
safety plan proportional to 
the actual flight test risks 
involved? 
 
It is essential that neither programme 
protection, nor physical safety measures 
are allowed to take sufficient precedence 
that the other suffers badly. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
Golden rules for programme protection: 
(1) Always have a second flight tester 
in the aircraft early in the 
programme, and keep them current 
on both the programme and the 
aircraft. 
(2) Always keep all planning and test 
reports in circulation to all players 
in the programme. 
(3) Always have a second specialist in 
the decision loop where 
recommendations are made. 
(4) Document everything that goes on 
during a programme. 
(5) Use some form of visible 
completion matrix to document test 
programme progress. 
 
But also always consider: 
(1) How important is programme 
protection for a particular activity? 
(2) The relationship between 
programme protection, and 
physical safety. 
 
And finally 
Never take approach or training for 
either programme safety or 
physical safety for granted – there 
is no standard answer for either. 
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